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CHAPTER FOUR

COMPLEMENTARITY
AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD: A CRITICISM

SECTION

I:

PROPOSITION

(I)

ON

SCIENTIFIC

METHOD

Proposition (I)
The definition of quantum mechanical variables can only be made
with the aid of classical physical concepts. These
identical –
except for refinements – with the concepts of everyday life. Heisenberg
has written: "The concepts of classical physics will remain the basis of
any exact and objective science. Because we demand of the results
of science that they can be objectively proved (i.e. by measurements,
registered on suitable apparatus) we are forced to express these results
in the language of classical physics ... Thus while the laws of classical
physics. . . appear only as limiting cases of more general and abstract
connections, the concepts associated with these laws remain an indis
pensable part of the language of science without which it would not be
possible even to speak of scientific results" 1.
Criticism
We contend that there are two logically distinct sets of concepts in
physics, whether in classical or in quantum physics; and that failure
to advert to this vitiates the above proposition. We attribute such
failure to a theory of knowledge implicit in the philosophy of comple
mentarity, a theory which is usually given the name psycho-physical
parallelism. As psycho-physical parallelism is the key to , the philo
sophic thinking of many physicists to-day, we shall devote the follow
ing paragraphs to it.
Psycho-physical Parallelism
The intentionality-structure of classical physics implied a naive
Cartesian Dualism of Mind and Body. In its original fonn, Cartesian
1 Heisenberg, Philosophic Problems etc., p. 45; the same idea is expressed in the same
author's Physics and Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 44, 144.
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Dualism regarded the knowing subject as "mirroring" the known object
(its referent), and the accuracy of the representation was guaranteed
by the veracity of God. Under the influence of the Kantian critique,
this dualism was transformed into a parallelism and was introduced
into the interpretation of modern physics by Bohr 1. His psycho
physical parallelism postulates a unique "translation" of physical events
into psychic acts of observation (called "sensations") 2. Science, then,
concerns itself with the organisation of these "sensations" on the
empirical level, and with the construction of theoretical entities
(theoretical constructs) to give them a coherent ground in a unified
consciousness. Whether the "sensations" were given an empiricist or
idealistic interpretation, the core idea was the same, namely, an
isomorphism between the content of conscious acts of observation (the
sensations) and the unconscious physical events which they express and
which are their underlying cause. The function of mind called sen
sation models physical events – not in the naive realistic way of
Cartesian Dualism which was based upon the isomorphism of (idealised)
bodies imaginatively represented with the external world – but only in
observation events (Beobachtungsvorgange). Only observation-events
express knowledge of physical reality. Physical reality is, by definition,
expressed by the type of sensations called "observation-events". A
scientific observation-event is one accomplished with the aid of
instruments.
Implicit in this view are two
about the nature of scien
tific method: (a) a physical property is the\direct physical correlate of
the empirical content of a scientific observation-event. In other words,
the act of observation translates the appropriate physical property into
the empirical content of a conscious act; that is, just as
colour" is related to "colour-as-sensed", and
shape" is
related to "shape-as-seen", so a "physical property" is related to the
"property-as-observed in the scientific observation-event". This
.

I

1 The Principle of Psycho-physical Parallelism was first expressed by G. Th. Fechner,
and it influenced the interpretation of physics through Wilhelm Ostwald's Lectures in
Natural Philosophy . Extracts from Ostwald's lectures are included in Heisenberg's collection:
"The Origins of the Mechanistic and Materialist World-View", Physicist's Conception of
Nature, pp. 137-151. (Although Heisenberg's name is on the book-cover, it is not clear that
he was also the compiler of the extracts. The extracts at any rate have a value of their own) .
2 N. Bohr, Naturwissen., XVII (1929); translated and published under the title "The
Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles of the Description of Nature", in Atomic
Theory and the Description of Nature, pp. 102-119. The first systematic use of the principle
in the quantum theory of measurement was made by J. von Neumann in Mathematische
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, (Berlin: Springer. 1932). In the English trans. by R. T.
Beyer, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, it is stated on p. 420.

/;
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implies that there is no logical difference in structure between the way
we express a physical property in a scientific concept and the way we
express an everyday property in an everyday concept. (b) Between the
use of everyday (pre-scientific) concepts and the use of scientific
concepts there is the difference that in science the intervention of
instruments occurs. These enable publicly objective comparisons to be
made and verified by different people and add a new exactness of
expression to the concepts through the use of mathematical relation
ships. They also perform the functions of filtering out unwanted
elements in a complex situation, of magnifying those we want, or of
"translating" them into new forms which our powers of perception
can better recognise and deal with. Useful and in fact indispensable as
these instruments are in physics, this view holds that they really come
between the physicist and the physical object, and, if the physical
object is very small, the presence of the instrument disturbs it. Ac
cording to this theory, which we called the perturbation theory of
measurement, the principal discovery of quantum mechanics is the
essential limitation of physical instruments to reveal very small
objects as they really are.
The second assertion (b) above will be considered fully in the next
section. In reply to the first assertion (a), we distinguish between two
classes of concepts. One has a logical structure based upon the re
semblances of things as regards their appearance to us and the uses
they have in the practical affairs of life. These \ descriptive concepts,
based upon thing-to-us relations, and they describe a World of things
and properties which are for-us. These are the concepts of everyday life,
enlarged and specialised so as to be able to describe experimental
procedures (operational concepts) and experimental results (obser
vational concepts).
The other class of concepts has a logical structure based upon
resemblances as regards the mutual interactivity of things. They are
explanatory concepts, founded upon thing-to-thing
and they
describe a World of things for-things and of properties . for-things,
notably for that class of things which can serve our purpose as measuring
instruments 1. The resemblances on which these concepts are based
I

1 The expression World-for-things does not connote that an observer-instrument (which
is the thing in the World -for-things) has a consciousness like a human observer open to a
horizon of reality called a World. Reality is known only by a human observer. But just as
everyday realities are known within a World-structure which is a set of relations to the knower,
so we state that scientific realities are known within a World-context of a set of relations
centered on things (or observer-instruments) . One might take the expression "World-for
things" to be shorthand for "World-of-things-to-things-for-us". See below, chapter VII.
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cannot be known directly, since they do not concern how things look
or appear to us. They can only be inferred from their effects in nature
and in the controlled environment of the laboratory. These effects are
sensible signs or observable symbols which, when interpreted correctly,
reveal a network of related activities among things. Since a physical
theory is the expression of an insight into such a set of interrelated
activities, an act of observation is not simply the translation into
consciousness of a physical event. It is the perception of a sensible event
and, with it, the recognition that it is endowed with a symbolism
revealing something which is not per se sensible, since it is neither a
thing-for-us nor a property-for-us, but a thing-for-things or a property
for-things. As a consequence, the function of a measuring instrument
which is the term of such relations – is not just to bring a degree of
exactness and public objectivity into science 'w hich everyday
knowledge lacks, but to help to create a new kind of knowledge, based
upon a new kind of concept, expressing a new kind of relation. Just as
the observed effects of a physical property are known only through
observable symbols, like pointer readings, etc., so the mind can deal
with these properties only through a constructed mathematical
symbolism which symbolises in turn these observed effects and which,
through its mathematical form, reveals the essential, relational
structure of the symbolised properties.
A physical property or variable, then, is expressed by us as the union
of two concepts – an explanatory concept 1 and an operational concept.
The explanatory concept draws its intelligibility from a systematic
totality which in the concrete is a sphere of reality to which we give
the name W orld-for-things and is the sphere of
scientific real.
Operational concepts and observational concepts draw their intelli
gibility from a systematic totality which in the concrete is the sphere
of the everyday real which is called the World-for-us. Each World has
its own symbolic embodiment in a language; the observation language
of the World-for-us and the explanatory language of
World-for
things, which are linked by their common denotation 2. The linguistic
link between the two languages is called a correspondence rule.
We stress the operational aspect of physical properties, since it is by
certain activities on our part that we produce the controlled environ
ment in which things interact among themselves in such a way as to
ground a single thing-to-thing relation and a single property. But we
1

See

2

Infra, chap. x.

pp.

COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

6r

do not say, as Bridgman and the advocates of operationalism say, that
the physical concept is no more than a generalised set of procedures to
be performed by us. The physical concept explains the procedures, that
is, it gives the reason why they measure one single property (and not
a mixture of properties). It also explains why the set of measuring
devices for a single property is an open set.

A Pseudo-problem
The distinctions we have just made belong to physical (or scientific)
method in so far as this is a human way of investigating reality. From
the failure to distinguish the human element in physics from its proper
object, many pseudo-scientific problems arise. Complementarity, for
instance, fails to recognise the difference in logical
between
physical concepts and the concepts of everyday life, and consequently
overlooks the difference between the observable symbol which is an
event in everyday life and the physical thing or property which is
essentially unrepresentable in observational concepts. This gives rise
to a series of pseudo-scientific problems based upon the dilemma: Is
a quantum system a wave or a particle? In chapter v we explain our
reasons for stating that it is at the same time both a wave and a particle,
and neither one nor the other. It is neither, since a particle and a wave
as objects of observation belong to the symbolic order and do not
constitute the reality of the quantum system; it is both a wave and
a particle, however, since "wave" and
describe aspects of
the mathematical formalism within which, in some way, the consti
tution of the quantum system is defined.
Conclusion
To summarize briefly the content of this section: it is our view that
classical and quantum physics share the same operational and ob
servable concepts, but that they differ in explanatory concepts. We
shall return to this point in a later chapter.
We have also deduced that observable physical data
a two-fold
reality: the physical reality of an observable symbol (e.g., a pointer
reading, etc.), and the intentional reality of a property symbolised. The
direct empirical object of the act of observation is the sensible symbol;
the indirect object (known only through interpretation) is the property
symbolised. The mathenlatical expression of a scientific theory parallels
this twofold reality by using mathematical symbols in two ways, (a) to
define the properties by implicit definition, and (b) to interpret the
j
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mathematical symbol observationally, i.e., by indicating what ob
servable symbols (for example, the reading of a dial or the average of
such readings), the mathematical symbol stands for.
The failure to distinguish between observable symbol and physical
property can lead to a variety of philosophical opinions about the
representative value of science. All fonus of parallelism, for instance,
lead to the fallacious view that the aim of scientific method is to
construct, if possible, a perceptible (anschaulich) model of reality
directly "translatable" into ontological terms. By "perceptible model"
we mean in general, one constructed on the basis of sensible thing-to
us relations. Such a model may be thought of as a true model expressing
reality-as-it-is-in-itself (realism), or merely as a surrogate model useful
merely for prediction and practical purposes
With regard to the ontological value of physics, physicists, roughly
speaking, take up one of two positions. The first is a rationalist realism
for macrophysics following the tradition of classical physics. This is
often accompanied by a rationalist instrumentalism in the field of
quantum physics, because of the failure of quantum physics to con
struct a precise model based upon the classical limiting concepts of
particle and field. This is the position, for :, example, of Einstein,
Schrodinger, Bohm, Vigier, Rosen, et al. It is especially characteristic
of physicists who have specialised in the theory of relativity and are
looking for a unitary field theoretic description of the universe. What
characterises this group is a Platonic
to equate the meaning
of reality with whatever can be understood conceptually, leaving empiri
cal experience merely to provide the occasion for the recognition of exist
ence. The second is an empiricist realism with regard tomacrophenomena.
This conceives physical reality to be no more then what is given factually
in experience. This is often accompanied by an empiricist or positivistic
instrumentalism in quantum physics, because the abstract norms of quan
tum physics, as, for example, the Psi-function, are so unanschaulich or
unimaginable 1. We shall return to these distinctions in a
chapter.

SECTION II: PROPOSITION (2) ON SCIENTIFIC METHOD

Proposition (2)
The act of measurement perturbs the object. Its objective state
("objective", that is, "not affected by the subjectivity of purely private
1

See infra, chapter

VII .

For the remarks of an eminent physicist on the different philo
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experience") then cannot be known – whether as an object of empirical
science (a phenomenal object) or as a reality (an object in the strict or
formal sense) 1. The Indeterminacy Principle expresses the degree of
this perturbation, and thereby traces the limits of our power of knowing
the physical object. Heisenberg has written:
ordinary description
of nature, and the idea of exact laws, rests on the assumption that it
is possible to observe the phenomena without appreciably influencing
them. To co-ordinate a definite cause to a definite effect has sense only
when both can be observed without introducing a foreign element
disturbing their interrelation. The law of causality, because of its very
nature, can only be defined for isolated systems, and in atomic physics
even approximately isolated systems cannot be observed ... for in
atomic physics we are dealing with entities that are (so far as we know)
ultimate and indivisible. There exist no infinitesimals by the aid of
which an observation might be made without appreciable pertur
bation" 2. On the Indeterminacy Principle, he says that it
to
the degree of indeterminateness in the possible present knowledge of
the simultaneous values of various quantities with which the quantum
theory deals" 3.

General Criticism
The perturbation theory of measurement implies that the activities
which take place between object and instrument in the measuring
process serve no other function than to render
physical system
or some property of it accessible to a human observer by magnifying
it, otherwise "translating" it into a form in which it can produce a
perceptible impression on a human observer. The measuring process
is accused of perturbing to a greater or lesser extent the real physical
property which one wishes to measure. This theory implies that the
real physical property is other than what is defined by the measuring
process itself. It also implies that a physical property is a thing-to-us
relation. Two opinions are worth noting: (a) that of
Podolsky
and Rosen who would define a physical property as what is left after
the disturbance is removed 4, and (b) that of Bohr, Heisenberg and
others who would say that the disturbance is not removable either in
sophical outlooks of relativists and quantum theorists, see E. Wigner, "Relativistic In
variance and Quantum Phenomena", Rev. Mod. Phys., XXIX (1959), pp. 255-268.
1 The objectivity here denied is "public objectivity", a type of objectivity which has
always been regarded as a characteristic property of scientific knowledge. Cf. chapter v.
2 Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., pp. 62-6 3.
3 Ibid., p. 20.
4 Phys. Rev., XLVII (1935), p. 777.
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fact or in principle, thus implying that all that can be known is an
interaction in which subject and object are inextricably mixed. This
latter position (b) leads to a distinction between physical states and
physical properties: a physical state being a set of relations to possible
observers which do not, however, define the physical properties of the
systenl while a physical property is the inaccessible residue of what
would be left if the disturbance could be removed. We believe that the
rational outcome of this dialectic is to affirm that a property of a
physical system is defined by its relations to other systems within the
measuring process, and not with respect to the possible direct percepti
ble experience of a human observer. We put forward, then, a relational
theory of physical properties 1.
The Relational Structure of Physical Properties
It is our view that a physical property (or a property of a physical
system) is the term of a relation set up between the physical system
and a measuring instrument: a relation resulting from the production
of a formal or proper effect in the measuring instrument by the inter
action during the measuring process. This proper or formal effect may
not itself be a sensible datum. It may be, for example, the emission of
a single photon and this is below the threshold of sensitivity. The
proper effect, however, must be such that it can be subsequently
transformed into a sensible datum through magnification techniques,
counters, etc. It is the
like the use of micro-ammeters,
outcome of such a transformation that we
an observable symbol.
The action between the object and the instrument is an interaction.
There is, consequently, an effect produced in each of the interacting
terms. The theory allows each of these effects to be used to measure the
same property in the other member of the interacting pair. For
example, the recording of a photon of energy E may be witness of an
exothermic radioactive disintegration of Q-value equal to E, or,
conversely, the recording of the energy of the disintegration
could be used as witness that a photon of energy E was emitted. Every
1 Similar ideas have been put forward by P. K. Feyerabend in "Problems of Micro
physics", Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, ed. by R. G. Colodny (London, Allen and
Unwin, 1963), pp. 189-283, and by M. Sachs in "A New Approach to the Theory of Funda
mental Processes", Brit. Jour. Phil. Sci., xv (1964),PP. 213-243. Sachs formulates the
principle that the laws of Nature must be described in terms of field variables that may be
associated only with elementary interactions (p. 221 our italics). Weyl seems to hold a similar
position, as for example, in Gruppentheorie und Quantenmechanik, p. 66, but the passage is not
reproduced in the English translation. It is clear, however, from Appendix C of his Philosophy
ot Mathematics and Natural Science, pp. 253-265, that he too adheres essentially to the pertur
bation theory of measurement, though he may not have been a ware of all its logical consequences.
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well-designed measuring-process, then, has a structure which can be
represented by the formula, aPb, where P represents the interaction
characteristic of the property P, and a and b are the terms affected and
so correlated by the interaction. It follows then that P founds a
twofold relation: (1) aPb, which reads: "The formal effect of P on the
instrument b, enters into the definition and measurement of the
property P of the object a". (2) aPb, which reads:

formal effect

of P on the instrument a enters into the definition and measurement
of the property P of the object b".
Not every interaction between a and b is or could become a
measuring-process. A necessary condition is that such ,an interaction
should be simple, i.e., that a virtually single formal effect should be
produced in a and in b (or if the formal effects be multiple, that all but
one could be filtered out). How is one to know which interactions are
potential measuring-processes and which are not? This is known not
by empirical generalisation from many cases, but by interpreting the
experimental process with the aid of a physical theory. It is on the
authority of a physical theory (or hypothesis)
such and such an
interaction is declared (positively or hypothetically) to be simple.
-

->-

-

Each of the relations aPb and aPb is founded upon an absolute ground
in a and in b respectively. So far as our knowledge goes, the physical
property is the absolute ground which orients the
system to the
production of an appropriate formal effect in other things. We call the
absolute ground the primary relativity of a physical property. What
then is the absolute ground?
We have already mentioned that a definition defines not a concrete
essence in its particularity, but an ideal norm, and an ideal norm expresses
a certain similarity in which many things (actually or potentially)
things
share. The similarity in question here is a similarity in the

' -I

act upon one another as, for example, in the two relations aPb an
aPb. The property, as so defined, is an explanatory property. It follows
from this that we only know the properties of things within a pattern of
relations which is itself grounded upon a pattern of interactions. It
might be surmised that another kind of intellect would be capable of
knowing the ground of a property absolutely. Some might say even
that the human intellect in other non-scientific kinds of knowledge
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would be able to know the ground of a property absolutely. However,
even if this were so, it might still be doubted whether the absolute
ground for any of the relations we are talking about would turn out
to be intelligible apart from a World of actually related and interacting
things which would give meaning to the ground. It is our view that the
essential nature of the ground is to be oriented towards action with and
upon things and SQ to the constitution of a World.
The pattern of relations which define the explanatory concepts is the
physical theory. Let the relations which found the physical properties
be symbolised by Pi (i = 1,2, ... , n); let Pi (i = 1,2, ... , n) be the
corresponding interactions, and let Pi (i = 1,2, ... , n) be a numerical
variable obtained by mapping the formal effects onto the real number
field by a system of meters, circuits, etc. The mapping may be done
in either of two ways: either by a direct mapping of individual concrete
experiments onto the number field – this is the way of quantum
mechanics; or by an indirect mapping whereby individual concrete
values are taken as samples of some abstract ideal value (for example,
an average value) – this is the way of classical physics 1. Whatever
manner of mapping is used, the physical
asserts a certain set of
equations:
j = 1,2, ... , m
These equations have the effect of defining Pi in a mutual fashion by
implicit definition of the set of variables
in other words, we say that
the set Pi is a self-defining set of numerical variables. As the Pi are
uniquely detern1ined with respect to the formal effects of Pi (through
the magnification or other transformation which produces the re
spective observable symbol), the implicit definition of the Pi can be
interpreted to mean that the set {Pi} of the physical interactivities is
a self-correlated set; or, in other words, that the set of relations {Pi} is
a closed self-defining set of relations.
In quantum mechanics, the properties are represented by linear
operators Pi and not by numerical variables. The equations of the
axiomatic theory are operator equations on a Hilbert space of physical
states. Each operator Pi represents a physical activity Pi, and its
eigen values are the possible range of values Pi. As in the former
case, the operator equations have the effect of mutually defining Pi
by implicit definition of the set {Pi}. This implicit definition of Pi can
__
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be interpreted to mean that the set {Pi} of physical activities is a self
correlated set and that the set of relations {Pi} is a self-defining set.
A pair of non-commuting operators would mean that the physical
activities corresponding to these operators interfere with one another
in the concrete. We shall postpone further discussion of the various
interpretations of the quantum mechanical formalism to another
section. For the present, it is sufficient if we have made it clear what we
mean when we say that a physical property is the term of a relation
founded upon interactivity; that its primary relativity is defined
implicitly by an explanatory definition which involves a systematic
totality constituted by a mutually-defining set of interrelated properties 1.
Returning to the act of measurement: this is completed by an act
of observation in which the observer-scientist recognises certain
sensible data either as the formal effect of a certain property Pi of the
measured object, or as something uniquely derived from it through
ancillary devices, such as meters, circuits, etc. Besides providing
instances of a physical property Pi, the sensible data also provide the
values of the secondary detenninations associated with the measured
property. These are the measure-numbers Pi of the property.
In classical physics, these measure-numbe
treated in either of
two ways. (I) Abstractly – as samples of an idealised model of a physical
process; this treatment leads to a deterministic theory like Newtonian
mechanics. Consequently, the properties of classical physics are
affected by a certain ideal and abstract character which is intrinsic to
the method used. Or (2), they may be used as a
of individual values,
in which case they constitute a statistical distribution (of the type of a
"distribution of errors") of which the ideal classical model is the
A characteristic of classical physics is that a statistical theory is distinct
from the deterministic theories which define the elements of the
statistical ensemble.
Quantum mechanics differs from both of the older types of physical
theories. It has in common with both, however, the
structure
of human scientific knowing. Quantum mechanics, then, expresses both
1 "The concepts with which natural science deals are not qualities or attributes which
can be obtained from the objective world by direct cognition. They can only be obtained by
an indirect methodology, by observing their reactions with other bodies, and their implicit
definition is consequently conditioned by definite laws of nature governing reactions",
H. Weyl, Theory of Groups and Quantum Theory, trans. by H. P. Robertson (New York :
1931), p. 76; d. also his PhilosoPhy of Math. etc., pp. 137-164. For Weyl, however, the concept
does not express what is intrinsic to the physical object. For an example of how a physical
theory like Newtonian Mechanics is composed of undefined elements defined implicitly by
mathematical operations, ct., P. Suppes, Introduction to Logic (Princeton: 1957), pp. 291-304.
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an idealised model and, at the same time, tries to make allowance for
the variety of concrete cases. This makes the problem of separation
method and object in quantum mechanics more difficult than in the
older theories, since it seems to have two objects and two methods
which, according to the majority of physicists, are inseparable from one
another. On the other hand, quantum mechanics has a kind of sim
plicity which neither of the older physical theories possesses; it is
concerned with the concrete instances of the ideal model or norm (or,
alternatively, the ideal law in its concrete instances) in their simul
taneous and actual union. Quantum mechanics is concerned, as
Heisenberg has said, with observation-events, that is with physical
reality in the most immediate and actual form in which it presents
itself to an investigator.
A characteristic feature of a classical theory is that the six state
variables of each particle, i.e., the three of position and the three
of momentum, are at each instant, independent degrees of freedom each
with a determinate value. Quantum physics overthrows this assunlption.
It shows that the measure-numbers for the six state variables are not
independent in the concrete, and, consequently, that position and
momentum do not constitute for the individual concrete particle
six independent degrees of freedom.
Remnants of Classical Rationalism
Why should this discovery have shocked\ physicists so much? The
reason was that, when quantum mechanics was discovered, physicists
had long been accustomed to accept uncritically the rationalist outlook
on physical reality characteristic of classical physics. If physical reality
is the subject of a classical description, then physical reality is something
ideal and abstract, viz., the content of a conceptual definition.
Quantum mechanics showed that concrete reality, as manifested in
empirical data, is capable of no such definition. Position and mo
mentum are concretely correlated variables and not independent
(aspects of a perfect conceptual model). Either physical reality was
parallel to a perfect conceptual model but was unknowable, or else
physical reality was known only in the concrete data. The first impact
of quantum mechanics was to send science back to individual concrete
experience. Science must return to the concrete, i.e., to the instances
of physical reality revealed in observation events. Many elements of
rationalism remained, however, in the revised outlook, of which the
perturbation theory of nleasurement is a good example. In spite of the
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conversion to a basic ontological empiricism, as to what gives meaning
to physical reality, the classical notion of a perfect set of measure
numbers tended to remain as the criterion which the physical reality
must satisfy. The perturbation theory of measurement witnesses to the
continuation of a strong current of rationalism within Heisenberg's
view of complementarity. This will be discussed in chapter VIII.
We hold, on the contrary, that the perturbation which takes place
when two conjugate properties are measured is a new revelation of the
properties of nature, and that this has led to a more accurate definition
of them, which now includes this perturbation as an essential part. Thus,
the Indeterminacy Relations supply not less, but more, information
about the object of physics then was possible before, since, in addition
to describing the kinds of similarities that exist between things, it also
tells us how intimately some are related to others in concrete individual
cases.
The Indeterminacy Relation
In our interpretation of the Indeterminacy Relation (or Inde
terminacy Principle) we agree with Heisenberg in the following points:
(a) that it expresses the fact that concrete acts measuring conjugate
variables generally and regularly interfere with one another 1; (b) that
it is in some way a measure of this mutual interference, and (c) that it
can be interpreted in two ways: as applicable to individual systems or
as applicable to ensembles of identical systems.,
The Indeterminacy Principle for individual systems is expressed by
the non-commutation of conjugate operators 2; for example, of
x (position) and p (the conjugate momentum). An operator represents
a property of an individual system. A property, as we have said, is
related to the act of measurement. Hence, the Indeterminacy Principle
states something about the incompatibility of conjugate properties of
an individual system even before an actual measurement is made 3.
The Indeterminacy Principle for ensembles of
systems is
expressed as the lower limit of the product of two standard deviations,
-e.g., Dx. Dp > h 4. In this form, it is a statistical principle, and
belongs properly only to ensembles of identical systems considered with
respect to the possible outcome of measurements made on each.
1

2

3

Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p. 3 and passim.
Ibid., pp. 118-123.
Ibid., pp. 13-14, 20-33.
Ibid., pp. 15-19, 34-46.
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However, this does not exhaust the problem, for we can inquire
further whether, and in what sense, the Indetenninacy Principle states
that the "use of the words 'position' and 'velocity' with an accuracy
exceeding that given [by this principle] is just as meaningless as the
use of words whose sense is not defined" 1. Heisenberg's answer is that,
since p and x are conditioned by their respective measuring-processes,
a non-compatibility of conjugate measuring processes leaves the
simultaneous pair (p, x) unrealisable 2; that is to say, it is without
denotation. As Heisenberg sometimes uses meaningless in just this
sense, we might inquire further if he thought that the simultaneous
pair (p, x) was also without connotation. A logical adherence to the
perturbation theory of measurement should lead to a rejection of the
stronger statement. Heisenberg's intention is ambiguous; he seems, as
in the passage we have just quoted, to deny even a connotation to a
pair of simultaneous values (p, x); but, in other places,
clearly
implies that this is not so; for example, with reference to extrapolation
into the past, he is ready to concede that it might be possible to calculate
exact simultaneous values for past events 3.
It is our view, however, that since the variables are also defined by
reference to the measuring-process, the connotation is also lacking.
However, a connotation can be lacking in one of two ways: either it is
contradictory (i.e., nonsense), or it is indeterminate. For example, the
actual values which specify the initial conditions of a classical system
are indeterminate but not
An indeterminate case
represents whatever is singular, unsystematic and irregular in a set of
similar instances. Every law states only what is regularly and generally
true. The statement that no deviation from the law occurs even in
singular instances and unsystematically is a new law and not a corollary
of the first. A minority of physicists, for example, among whom are
Einstein, Popper, Bopp and Bohm 4, have held that the simultaneous
pair (p, x) are determinate even if not always determinable. Margenau
; it would seem
would hold that they are also determinable,
that an indefinite time-interval might be required for the simultaneous
1
2

3

4

Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., pp. 20-46 where many examples of the Indeterminacy Relations are analysed.
Ibid., p. 20.
Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, pp. 81-87 where Einstein summarises his view

of the quantum theory, as well as the account by Bohr of his discussion with Einstein on the
foundations of quantum mechanics, ibid., pp. 199-242. Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific
Discovery (London: 1959), chap. IX. F. Bopp. Observation and Interpretation (London: 1957),
pp. 189-196. D. Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (Princeton: 1957). Heisen
berg lists some members of this school in Niels Bohr etc., pp. 12-29. Cf. infra, chap. v, Section IV.
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measurement 1. Suppes and Margenau have investigated the joint
probability of non-commuting operators 2. Suppes has shown that in
some cases at least, as, for example, in the first excited state of the
harmonic oscillator, no joint probability distribution for p and x exists,
while in other cases it does. Margenau has shown that in some cases
negative probability values arise. Where no joint probability distri
bution exists, no formula exists to give sense to a simultaneous pair of
values (p, x); i.e., it is non-sense and to this degree contradictory.
However, where a joint probability exists, there is no contradiction in
the formula (p, x), even though the association of values has no
determinate significance but only the indeterminate significance of a
chance association governed by a joint probability distribution.
Having listed the three points on which we agree with Heisenberg's
interpretation of the Indeternlinacy Relations, we now go on to mention
the three points on which we find ourselves in disagreement. We disa
gree with the view (1) that the Indeterminacy Relations express a
limitation of our knowledge of physical reality; (2) that a physical
property is something other
what is defined in and through the
measuring process itself, and (3) that there is no place for an objective
(i.e., publicly objective) science of microphysical objects, except as a
science of how we
and not of what we know. Since this last point
is based upon an analysis of the measuring
in quantum me
chanics, we shall devote the next section to a detailed discussion of this.

SECTION III: THE QUANTUM THEORY OF MEASUREMENT

Three Stages of a Measurement
The quantum theory of measurement as explained by Heisenberg
describes the process in three stages: (a) before the interaction of
instrument and object, (b) after the interaction, and, finally, (c) the
act of observation. We shall consider each of these in turn.
(a) The isolated object before the measurement is said to be a pure
case 3, and the state is represented by a ray in abstract Hilbert space
H. Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New York: 1950), p. 376.
P. Suppes, "Probability Concepts in Quantum Mechanics", Phil. Sci., XXVIII (1961),
pp. 378-389; H. Margenau, "Measurements and Quantum States", Phil. Sci., xxx (1963),
pp. 138-157.
3 A pure case (reiner Fall) or a pure state is one representable by a ray in Hilbert space;
statistically it means that it is impossible to produce it by combining statistical ensembles
with different characteristics. The term was introduced by H. Weyl and used by Heisenberg
and von Neumann. Cf., H. Weyl, Theory of Groups etc., p. 75;]. von Neumann, Mathematical
1

2
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which is usually taken to be a wave function
The wave function
is essentially related to a set of possible measuring processes or, as
Heisenberg expresses it, it represents a potentiality which is actuated
by a measuring process 1. It is a pure case, and as such it denotes an
individual something with properties some of which are precise and
have definite numerical values, like rest mass, electric charge, etc., and
others are imprecise but potentially precise since a precise value
depends on the choice and subsequent performance of some measuring
process. These potential properties occur in conjugate pairs. They are
potential since exact values cannot be simultaneously assigned to both
members of a pair of conjugate variables and, in the general case, no
precise value need be assignable to either member of the pair. They are
potential also with respect to the mathematical formalism, since value
is obtained only by the mathematical transformation of the original
pure case in which many values are potential into a new pure case
which is the eigen state of one precise value.
The permanent precise properties of a system, like rest mass, electric
charge, etc., are usually treated as invariance properties of the mathe
matical representation under some group of transformations. The
potential properties are related to the mathematical elements of the
transformation group 2. The wave function, then, represents something
of general validity in itself and is – according to Heisenberg – objective;
but since it does not represent a body or even a coherent set of events
in space and time it is not fully objective... "Was wir mathematisch
festlegen ist nur zum kleinen Teil 'objektives Faktum', zum grosseren
Moglichkeiten", said Heisenberg 3.
Teil eine Uebersicht
Since a pure case is mathematically well-defined, it represents an
ideal, abstract norm, which is a concept. This concept, moreover,
has reference to a concrete individual system, since experimental
evidence has shown that variables like energy, momentum, etc., are
conserved in collisions between individual systems. The quantum
description, in spite of the fact that it yields only ,statistical laws,
intends to be a description of an individual system
not merely of
Foundations etc., pp. 306-307, 328-329; Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p. 56. The
difference between a pure case and a mixture has been studied by E. P. Wigner in "The
Problem of Measurement", Am.
Phys., XXXI (1963), p. 6, and by H. Margenau, Phil.
Sci., xxx (1963), pp. 138-157.
1 W. Heisenberg, Niels
etc., p. 27; Physics and Philosophy, pp.
53, 91, 180, 185;
On Modern Physics (London: 1961), p. 9.
2 "All quantum numbers, with the exception of the so-called principal quantum number,
are indices characterising representations of groups", H. Weyl, Theory of Groups etc. p. XXI.
3 Heisenberg, Dialectica, loco cit., p. 333.
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the properties of a collective. The pure case (or wave function), more
over, connotes a whole form, since the wave function which represents
it, changes detenninistically and predictably, evolving through a
perfectly definite series of wave functions, governed by the appropriate
Schrodinger equation. It connotes then something which is formally
one, whole and complete.
On the other hand, the only predictions made by the theory are
statistical, and, consequently, the pure case is in some sense incomplete
and imprecise. The pure case also describes a statistical ensemble of
concrete cases, each characterised by the same wave function. There
is a parallel between the
case" in quantum mechanics and the
('state" of a classical system. The theoretical representation of an
individual system in classical physics is (as we have already noted) an
idealised and abstract norm, of which actual concrete systems constitute
a random sample. Classical physics deals with this ensemble by getting
help from outside, viz., from a statistical
of errors" ; quantum
mechanics on the other hand includes the statistical analysis within its
own formalism. This, as we have already pointed out, is connected
with the human way of scientific knowing.
Returning to the quantum theory of measurement: we are at a
loss to know how to treat Heisenberg's view of the nature of the
measuring process since he is not .the author of the "standard" or "
orthodox" view. However, it is generally held that
standard
view is an outgrowth of Heisenberg's paper in
the uncertainty
relation was first formulated" 1; and it is clear
the brief defence
Heisenberg made of it in 1955 that the regards it as the only authentic
account 2. The first to explore the consequences of Heisenberg's ideas
and to base a theory of measurement on them was von Neumann who
published his classic work on the mathematical foundations of
quantum mechanics in 1932 3. His view has come to be called the
"orthodox" view of the Copenhagen School. The clearest summary of
it, and the account from which we shall quote, is that given by
and Bauer 4,
'
Let the wave function before the measurement be denoted by
and let
k(X), k = 1,2, ... , be a complete set of eigen functions of
E. P. Wigner, Am. Jour. Phys., XXXI (1963), p. 6.
Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., p. 27.
3 ]. von Neumann, Mathematische Grundlagen usw., translated under the title Mathe
matical Foundations 0/ Quantum Mechanics.
4 F . London and E. Bauer, La
de l'observation en mecanique quantique (Paris :
Hermann, 1939).
1

2

74

COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

(say) the momentum P, where the corresponding eigen values of Pare
pk, k = 1,2, .... Then
can be written in the following way:
=

where
This is a pure case.
The process of measurement itself takes place in two stages:
(b) the interaction between the object and the apparatus which is
represented mathematically by the transformation of the pure case
into a mixture of the states k(X), and (c) an act of observation which
"registers" which of the states k(X) has been "actualised" by the
interaction.

Formation oj a Mixture
Let us consider first of all the interactions between the object and
the apparatus; and let the property measured by the apparatus be
the momentum P. The object-plus-apparatus comprises a closed and
isolated macroscopic physical system which is subject to the laws of
physics. Assuming that the quantum theory applies also to macroscopic
systems, it will have a comprehensive wave function X in which both
the variables of the object, viz., x, p, etc., and the variables of the
apparatus, viz., y, q, etc., will be present. Let the variable which is
correlated with the measured property P of the object be z. Let zo,
... Zi, ... be its eigen values (they are,
the positions of a pointer
on a scale) and
, 1 (y) , ...
, ... be the corresponding
eigen functions of the apparatus. Then, the nature of a measuring
apparatus is that there should exist such a correspondence between the
states k(X) of the object and the states
of the apparatus, that
from the pointer reading Zk of the apparatus, the value Pk for the
momentum of the object can be inferred.
Before the interaction, the comprehensive wave function X was
of the object and of the
simply the product of the wave function
wave function
of the zero state of the apparatus: Le.,
X

=

=

k

After the interaction, the only form which the comprehensive wave
function x(final) = Xl can have, and which is in keeping with the nature
and function of the measuring-process is,
Xl =
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That is, to every k there is coupled a
or in other words, from
every potential value Zk of the apparatus, we can infer a corresponding
value Pk for the momentum of the object. The final state
of the
combined instrument and object is a pure case as long as they consti
tute an isolated system and, as long as this is true, the values Zk are
only potential in the wave function, for it represents the total system.
A measurement, however, does not consider the total combined
system, but only one part of it, viz., the apparatus. Examining the
total wave function for the information it can yield about the state
of the apparatus, it can be shown that this is represented by what is
present in xr. Another mixture,
called a mixture of the eigen states
but this time of the k is in one-to-one correspondence with this and
represents the condition of the object. A mixture is a virtual ensemble
of different pure cases, each present with a certain determinate proba
bility; here the probability associated with
and with k is lakl 2 .
That is, from the point of view of the apparatus, the original pure case
of the object is transformed into a mixture containing all the eigen
states present in
each with its detemiinate probability now
actuated by the interaction. Such a mixture is an ordinary Gibb's
ensemble like those used in classical statistical mechanics 1. The state
of the system is now determinate but still unknown. The situation
might be compared with a card drawn at random from a pack of cards,
in which each card is marked with one of the k and each k is
represented in the pack with a frequency
to lakl 2 . The
ideal frequency of a set of random drawings from
pack is predicted
by the theory, but what the result will be in any concrete case cannot
be inferred from it. At this stage of the measurement, the quantum
mechanical situation would be like a card drawn from such a pack,
lying face down and not yet scrutinized. The quantum mechanical case
has by now been transformed into a case of classical statistics.

Act ot Observation
The measurement is completed by an act of observation which
ascertains which of the pointer values Zk has been actuated by the
interaction. From a pointer value Zk, one concludes that the object,
;

1 The reduction of a pure case to a mixture is often described as a projection of the pure
case on to its eigenstates; for the pure case is represented by a ray in Hilbert space which
is spanned by a complete set of eigenstates as if each of these were a coordinate axis in the
Hilbert space. The reduction of a pure case to a mixture is its projection on to the "coordinate
axes" of the space; the probability that a projection will take place along any particular axis
is proportional to the squared length of its projection on this axis. For this reason, the
measuring process is often called a projection operator.
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immediately after the measurement, is in the pure state k. Thus, the
final act of observation is a process of sampling the mixture (which is
a probability distribution) and of registering the contingent factual
outcome.
One fact, however, should be noted; that the comprehensive wave
function
for the combined object-apparatus system considered in
isolation from its surrounding contains more information than do the
separate mixtures produced by the interaction. Certain correlations
between the states of the object and those of the apparatus – viz.,
superposition states – have been destroyed by the measurement 1.
This results in an increase in entropy of the entire system consequent
upon the act of observation 2.
Apart fron1 its more subtle and
character, which
distinguishes it from the theory of measurement in classical physics,
the quantum mechanical theory of measuren1ent seems to be straight
forward enough and obscure philosophical questions seem to be fairly
remote. However, just as the initial insight of Heisenberg into the
foundations of physics was fraught with philosophical consequences,
so the defects in his philosophical view came to be incorporated into the
very heart of quantum mechanics, viz., into
theory of measurement.

The Observer in Quantum Mechanics
According to Heisenberg, the function of the observer is to "register
decisions" 3, i.e., to record which of the
contained in the
statistical mixture described above has in fact been actualised by the
measurement. He says that the recording can be done as well by a
photographic-plate as by a human observer. However, as Wigner and
others have shown, this does not follow from the theory, since in so far
as the object-plus-instrument-plus-photographic-plate constitute a
larger isolated system, the theory allows one to deduce no more than
the pure
: To obtain verifiable formulae, one must pass to the next
stage, namely, of the formation of a mixture, and
supposes that
the system is subject to a super act of observation from outside which
interferes with the state of the system. To go from the pure state to
1 "Of paramount philosophical significance . . . is that (3) the whole is always more, is
capable of a much greater variety of wave states than the combination of the parts. Disjoint
parts in an isolated system of fixed wave states are in general not statistically independent
even if they do not interact", H . Weyl, Philosophy of Math . etc., p. 263; d. also, London
and Bauer, loco cit., pp. 34-37.
2 London and Bauer, loco cit., p. 30; also von Neumann, loco cit., pp. 379-398. Cf. also
Appendix, pp. 180-2.
Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., p . 22.
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the mixture, and thence to the question of fact, a union must take place
between the photographic-plate and the sensibility of a human
observer. While this union is physically no different from that between
object and apparatus, the human sensibility, however, has the
"characteristic and familiar power which we can call the 'power of
introspection'" 1 by which it can take cognizance of its own state,
and so emerge from the indeterminacy of a mixture to the determinacy
of fact by an act of auto-observation 2. Fron1 a knowledge of his
own state, the human observer infers the correlative state in which
the object finds itself after the measurement. The process of passing
from the initial pure state of the object to the final pure state after
observation is called the "reduction of the wave packet". It is physical
as we have already explained; it is psychological since requires the
intervention of a human act of auto-observation, and it is also logical
because, in the language of complementarity, the wave picture dissolves
into that of the complementary particle picture, and this fact gives
its name to the entire process, viz., the "reduction" or "contraction of
the wave packet".
Reduction of the Wave Packet
One of the most controversial topics
quantum mechanics to-day
is the reduction of the wave packet. There are three problems. (1) Does
the reduction entail a real occurrence in the physical object independent
of the conscious act of observation; or is it
a "reduction of
knowledge", i.e., a change in representation due to the acquisition of
new information about the object without entailing a significant
change in the object; or does it include both of these? This will be
discussed in the next chapter. (2) Is the Projection Postulate a necessary
part of quantum mechanics? That is: is a definite eigen state the new
pure state produced by the act of measurement or does the act of
measurement measure the state as it was before the measurement,
whatever happens to the system after or as a result of the measurement
(e.g., the system might be destroyed by the measurement as, for
example, when a photon is absorbed)? This is principally a physical
London and Bauer, loco cit., p. 42.
Note how the act of auto-observation, as described by London and Bauer, assumes a
coincidence or at least a parallelism between consciousness (Le., the content of the conscious
act of observation) and the physical substratum (Le., the physical state of the eyes, nerves,
brain, etc., ot the human observer). Implied in this account is also the theory that conscious
ness (or rather acts of observation of reality) also follows quantum mechanical laws. We
shall return to this later in chap. v.
1

2
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problem and it will not be discussed in this book 1. (3) Is the "reduction
of the wave packet" a process essentially different from the mere
sampling of a statistical distribution, whether this be a classical
(stochastic) distribution or one of some non-classical type? This
problem will be discussed in the section entitled "Formal Objectivity"
in the next chapter and in chapter VI.
Heisenberg, von Neumann, Wigner, London and Bauer regard the
reduction of the wave packet as a new and unique kind of psycho
physical proiection operator terminating in the projection on to the
plane of actuality of one of the potential states represented in the
wave packet. Many physicists find this explanation unclear and
permeated with dubious epistemological presuppositions.
complains:
agreement has been reached whether the said 'con
traction' is physical, mental, real, pictorial, objective or subjective.
But something must contract, since Heisenberg said so thirty years
a g0 "2 .

Obiectivity of Quantum Mechanics
A disturbing question is suggested by the views of Heisenberg,
Wigner, von Neumann and others, that the (private) sensibility of
the individual human observer is an essential determinant of the
object of quantum mechanics. If this is so, how can public objectivity,
a necessary condition of all science, exist in quantum mechanics?
One answer is that given by London and Bauer 3. The instrument
and the eye are macroscopic systems. Hence, the quantum mechanical
treatment of the link between the two must approach the classical
limit, which is, of course, the paragon of public objectivity. They argue
that the coupling between the eye and the apparatus changes the
apparatus only negligibly and that, consequently, the same corre
spondence exists between the apparatus and the eye of any observer 4.
1 Among those physicists who reject the Projection Postulate are, Margenau, Lande,
Feyerabend, Schrödinger. Cf. H . Margenau, Phil. Sci., xxx (1963), --'16, 138-157; P. K.
Feyerabend, Frontiers of Science and Philosophy; A. Lande, From Dualism to Unity in
Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge: 1960); E. Schrödinger, Naturwiss ., XXIII (1935), p. 812 .
2 A. Lande, "From Dualism to Unity in Quantum Mechanics" , in Current Issues in the
Philosophy of Science, ed. by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (New York : 1961), p. 355 .
3 London and Bauer, loco cit. pp. 48-51; also D. Bohm, Quantum Theory (New York :
Prentice-Hall, 1951); G. Ludwig, Die Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (Berlin: 1954);
P. K . Feyerabend, Observation and Interpretation (London: 1957); A. Daneri, A . Loinger,
G. M. Prosperi, Nucl. Phys., XXXIII (1962), p. 297.
4 Recent studies have shown that the size of the apparatus is of considerable importance
to the measurement. E. Wigner and H. Salecker showed the necessity of relatively massive
apparatus for the precise de termination of time (Phys. Rev., CIX, 1958, p. 571); for the
influence of the size of the apparatus on the accuracy of measurements, d., E. Wigner,
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London and Bauer conclude their study with the reassuring statement:
possibility of prescinding from the individuality of the observer
and of creating a collective scientific consciousness cannot be seriously
questioned" 1.
This answer is based upon the Correspondence Principle and upon
the assumption that quantum mechanics, in so far as it is applicable
to macro-phenomena, gives nothing more that what classical physics
would give in these cases. This is a common view of the Correspondence
Principle, and not altogether a correct one; for quantum physics could
give classical results in certain appropriate limiting cases without
excluding the possibility that quantum physics contains something
more, for example, a more exact explanation of the relation between
observer-subject and observed-object in physics – even of macroscopic
phenomena. Heisenberg, Wigner, von Neumann, for example, clearly
imply that something more is given 2. Others, like Ludwig, try to
avoid this conclusion by restricting the applicability of quantum
physics to microscopic phenomena and to marginal cases 3. The
majority of physicists, however, among whom is Heisenberg, hold
that the quantum mechanical domain includes also the domain of
classical physics. There is a connection between this view and the
insistence on the inescapable precence of subjectivity in modern
physics.

Summary
The philosophy of complementarity, while successful in providing
physicists with a common language with which to describe quantum
phenomena, also contains a theory about scientific method and about
human knowing which is open to criticism. In this chapter, we criticised
the following points arising out of the philosophy of complementarity:
psycho-physical parallelism; the view that quantum mechanical
properties are to be defined classically; and the perturbation theory
Zeit f. Physik,

CXXXI (1952) p . 101; A mer. Jour. Phys., XXXI (1963), p. 6; H. Araki and
M. Yanase, "Measurement of Quantum Mechanical Operators", Phys. Rev., cxx (1960),
pp. 622-626; M. Yanase, "Optimal Measuring Apparatus", Phys. Rev., CXXIII (1961), pp.
666-668. Wigner concludes: "This raises the suspicion that the macroscopic nature of the
apparatus is necessary in principle" (Am. Jour. Phys., XXXI, 1963, p. 6).
1 London and Bauer, lac. cit., p . 49.
2 E. Wigner, "Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem", in The Scientist Speculates, ed. by
I. J. Good (London: 1962), pp. 284-301; ]. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations etc.;
W . Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., pp. 12-29.
3 G. Ludwig,
und ungeloste Probleme des Messprozesses", in Werner Heisenberg
die Phvsik unserer Zeit, ed. by F. Bopp (Braunschweig : 1961), pp. 150-181. Ludwig
.
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of measurement. In the course of the criticism, we elaborated the
distinction between two types of concepts with different logical
structures; viz., operational or observational concepts which state a
similarity between things judged on the basis of appearance or utility
to us, and explanatory concepts which state a similarity between things
judged on the basis of a self-defining set of different relations between
things. We have shown how a physical concept is definable by any
appropriate measuring-process. The description of the measuring
process and, hence, the definition of the physical property involve the
two classes of concepts described above, but in different ways. This
leads us to regard the Indeterminacy Relations, not as stating limi
tations of our knowledge, but as describing more exactly the behaviour
of individual systems.

